

Shuo Xu

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Citizenship and Visa Status

China (F-1 Visa)

Education

Ph.D. Economics, The Ohio State University, 2021 (expected)
Dissertation: "Essays on Information Economics"
Committee: Yaron Azrieli (Chair), James Peck, John Rehbeck, Huanxing Yang
M.A. Economics, The Ohio State University, 2016
B.A. Economics, University of Virginia, with distinction, 2015
B.A. Mathematics, University of Virginia, 2015

Teaching and Research Fields

Primary fields: Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics
Secondary fields: Industrial Organization

Research Papers

"Information Obfuscation" (Job Market Paper)

We consider a Bayesian persuasion setting where a sender maximizes the probability of a receiver with private taste choosing a risky action. The sender designs a menu of information structures and can use information obfuscation, strategically making information structures costly for the receiver to process. When information obfuscation strictly benefits the sender, a low-stake receiver chooses a costless and less informative information structure, while a high-stake receiver chooses a costly and more informative information structure. When information obfuscation is not helpful to the sender, the sender chooses a single information structure with zero information processing cost. When the sender simultaneously designs a noncontingent transfer besides a menu of information structures, information obfuscation is not helpful, and the sender charges the highest possible price and extracts all surplus.

"Bayesian Persuasion with Complementary Information" (Submitted)

A decision maker chooses between the status quo and an alternative action under uncertainty. The uncertainty is two-dimensional and its realization in each dimension is independent. For each dimension, there is an expert who provides information only on that dimension. Both experts strictly prefer the alternative action and they simultaneously provide information to the decision maker. We compare the highest equilibrium payoff of the experts in this game with the payoff of an auxiliary game where the experts collude and can choose any information structure. We show that the experts strictly gain from collusion if and only if one of the experts can unilaterally persuade the decision maker to take the alternative action with positive probability.

Research in Progress

"(Cost-of-) Information Design" with Yaron Azrieli

We introduce the cost of information design problem where a decision maker acquires information subject to a cost selected by a designer. We show that when restricted to the family of convex and posterior-separable cost functions, the designer achieves the same level of utility as in the case where she herself chooses the information for the decision maker. When the cost functions are finite and invariant to the labeling of the states, we show in an example that the designer induces partially

informative information. We also introduce competition to the cost of information design problem where two designers simultaneously select the cost of information and the decision maker is subject to the minimum of the costs. We show in an example that the designers exhibit Bertrand-like behaviors and the unique equilibrium is for the designers to induce full information at zero cost.

Conference and Seminar Presentations

October 11-13, 2019	Midwest Economic Theory and International Trade Conference
July 15-19, 2019	The 30 th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

Spring 2020	Departmental Citation for Excellence in Teaching
2015-2016	University Fellowship

Teaching Experience

Teaching Assistant for Professor Jeffery Buser, Professor Darcy Hartman, Professor Ida Mirzaie:	
Principles of Microeconomics	Fall 2017, Fall 2019, Spring 2020, Fall 2020
Principles of Macroeconomics	Spring 2018, Fall 2018, Spring 2019

References

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