Sangjun Yea

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Citizenship and Visa Status

Republic of Korea (F-1 visa)

Education

Ph.D. Economics, The Ohio State University, 2019 (expected)
Dissertation: "Essays in Information Economics and Bargaining"
Committee: James Peck (chair), Yaron Azrieli, Huanxing Yang
M.A. Economics, The Ohio State University, 2014
M.A. Economics, Yonsei University, 2013
B.S. Mathematics, Yonsei University, summa cum laude, 2011
B.A. Economics, Yonsei University, 2011

Teaching and Research Fields

Primary fields: Information Economics, Theoretical Industrial Organization Secondary fields: Mechanism Design, Bargaining

Research Papers

"Persuasion under the Influence of Fake News" (Job Market Paper)

We study a dynamic model in which two information senders having opposite preferences persuade voters when the first mover's news can be fabricated by the second mover, but the voters do not know the genuine source of the news. We characterize both senders' equilibrium strategy by introducing a novel method applying Rothschild-Stiglitz approach. In equilibrium, the first sender is disciplined to generate more informative news as the second sender's influence increases, thereby increasing the voters' informational surplus. However, beyond a threshold level, the second sender's influence totally deteriorates the informational value of the first sender's news. We analyze a class of games where the second sender's ability to adapt an information generation process varies with the first sender's strategy and show that the second sender's uninformative news generating behavior is a robust equilibrium outcome. This result rationalizes the emergence of fake news in social media where the source of news is hardly identifiable.

"Quality Disclosure in Online Marketplaces," R&R at Journal of Industrial Economics.

I analyze duopoly firms' quality disclosure incentive when they sell a horizontally and vertically differentiated product in an online marketplace. The vertical characteristic of a product, say quality, is common to all consumers but is privately known to its producer while the horizontal characteristic of both products is known to all consumers. I assume that the online marketplace can observe the true quality of both products that are sold through it and can send unverifiable messages to consumers without incurring costs. I show that there exists a set of equilibria where both firms use a cutoff strategy for quality disclosure and the online platform makes a recommendation about which product is of higher quality. I also show that making a recommendation is the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy for the platform among all possible equilibrium strategies when no firm discloses quality. I find that the firms which are under an informative platform withhold information more than the firms under an uninformative platform. Comparative statics and welfare comparisons between an informative platform and an uninformative platform are provided.

Research in Progress

"Selling with Deposits"

"Public Communication with Selective Transmitter" (with Daeyoung Jeong)

Presentations

Invited Seminars

December 2017 Yonsei Economic Research Institute Seminar, Seoul, Korea.

Conferences

March 2017 The 81st Midwest Economics Association Annual Conference,

Cincinnati, OH.

May 2017 Midwest Economic Theory Conference, Lexington, KY.

July 2017 The 28th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook,

NY.

October 2018 Midwest Economic Theory Conference, Nashville, TN.

Research Experience and Other Employment

Summer 2018 Professor James Peck, The Ohio State University, Research Assistant

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2017-2018	IMCB Research-Travel Support, The Ohio State University
/U1/-/U18	TIME B RESEARCH - FRAVEL SUNDORL THE UNIO STATE UNIVERSITY

2013-2014 University Fellowship, The Ohio State University

2011-2012 The Kwanjeong Educational Foundation Scholarship (Graduate)

2011 Highest Honors Graduation Award, Yonsei University 2006-2010 The Kwanjeong Educational Foundation Scholarship

(Undergraduate)

Teaching Experience

Fall 2018 Principles of Microeconomics, The Ohio State University, Recitation

Leader

Spring 2016, Spring Microeconomic Theory 2A (Ph.D. Course), The Ohio State

2017 University, Teaching Assistant for Professor Lixin Ye

Fall 2014, Spring 2015, Principles of Macroeconomics, The Ohio State University, Recitation

Fall 2017 Leader

References

Professor James Peck (Chair)

Department of Economics

The Ohio State University

Professor Yaron Azrieli

Department of Economics

The Ohio State University

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Professor Huanxing Yang Department of Economics The Ohio State University

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